j riJc /cn^'owc, that for whose sake (or the final cause), and that from which the principle of motion is,—or the efficient cause; he determines, that the former of these two is the principal: *<paiv£-*

rat §£ srpcarT} iji/ *eyofitv* ei/e/ca rtvoc- Xoyoc yap OVTO£, *apyrrj* $£ o XoyO£, o^u-oiwc, *svr£ roig Kara* re^v^v *Kat roig*

<j>v<?et cruvearripcoarn/. The chiefest of these two causes seems to be the final or the intending cause ; for this is reason, and reason is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things.—Nay, the philosopher adds, excellently, that there is more of reason and art in the things of nature, than there is in those things that are artificially made by men:

/uaXXov §' *£<rrl TO ov* £i/€Ka /em TO icaXov *v roig* <J>va-£wc cpyaec, *%* cv role rife r^vrje. There is more of final or intending causality, and of the reason-of good, in the works of nature, than in those of human art.

—After which he greatly complains of the first and most ancient physiologers, meaning thereby Anaximander, and those other Ionics before Anaxagoras, that they considered only *rjv* vXiKijv apx^v> ^e material principle and cause of things, —without attending to those two other causes, the principle of motion, atid that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air, and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous concourse of these senseless bodies. But at length Aristotle falls upon Democritus, who,

being ju
nior to those others before-
mentioned, philoso
phized after the same Atheistical
manner, but in
a new way of his own, by atoms;
acknowledging
no other nature, neither in the universe,
nor in 4he
bodies of animals, than that of
fortuitous me
chanism, and supposing all things* to
arise froiji
the different compositions of
magnitudes, figures,